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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARION S. GOELTZ, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
THE CONTINENTAL BANK Case No. 8408 
AND TRUST COMPANY, a 
Utah banking corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
PETITION FOR REHEARING AND BRIEF 
IN SUPPORT THE'REOF 
PE'TITION FOR REHEARING 
Comes now defendant in the above entitled 
matter and respectfully petitions this court for a 
re-hearing of the decision heretofore entered on 
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July 27, 1956 on the following grounds and for the 
following reasons: 
., 
I. The court erred in deter~ining that the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing 
to allow appellant bank to amend its complaint to 
place in issue the Statute of Limitations. 
II. The court erred in determining that the 
new evidence of plaintiff did not substantially af-
fect the question of the Statute of Limitations. 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PE'TITION 
FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF P·OINTS 
POINT I. THE COURT ERRED IN DETERMIN-
ING THAT THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCREITION IN REFUSING TO ALLOW APPELLANT 
BANK TO AMEND ITS COMP AINT TO PLACE IN 
ISSUE THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
POINT II. THE COURT ERRED IN DETERMIN-
ING THAT THE NEW EVIDENCE OF PLAINTIFF 
DID NO'T SUBSTANTIALLY AFFECT THE QUESTION 
OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
A'RGUMENT 
POINT I. THE COURT ERRED IN DETERMIN-
ING THAT THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCREITION IN REFUSING TO ALLOW APPELLANT 
BANK TO AMEND ITS COMP AINT TO PLA·CE IN 
ISSUE THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
The court court ruled that justice did not re-
quire this amendment to the pleadings. It further 
asserted that "to defeat a claim by the bar of the 
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Statute of Limitations is not a determination of a 
case on its merits." It is submitted that such a state-
ment implies that the Statute of Limitations lacks 
merit as a defense- that it has a taint of legalism 
and formality to be frowned upon. Such an attitude 
is contrary to the many pronouncements of this 
court and of courts generally, that the defense is 
a meritorious one performing a salutary purpose. 
(See for example, Gibson v. Jensen, 48 Utah 244, 
158 P. 426). It is, therefore, a statement not sup-
ported by the rulings of this very court. 
It is submitted that in frowning on a techni-
cal defense on one hand, this court has on the other 
hand used legal reasoning of the utmost technicality 
to deny the Bank relief. 
Defendant bank from the outset of this action 
entered a plea a laches. The doctrine of laches was 
applied, as we all know, by the courts of equity for 
identical purposes as the Statute of Limitations was 
applied by courts of law. Indeed, courts of equity 
in applying the doctrine of laches often looked for 
guidance to the Statute of Limitations. The doc-
trine of laches is, in fact, more demanding than the 
Statute. 
"The defense of laches is different from 
the defense of the statute of limitations in 
this, that in order to bar a remedy because 
of laches there must appear, in addition to 
mere lapse of time, some circumstances from 
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which the defendant or some other person 
may be prejudiced, or there must be such 
lapse of time that it may be reasonably sup-
posed that such prejudice will occur if the 
remedy is allowed; whereas in the case of 
the statute of limitations there need be noth-
ing more than mere lapse of time in order to 
constitute a bar." 34 Am. Jur. p. 15, Limita-
tions of Action Section 15. 
The Bank by seeking to amend to assert a less 
demanding test, certainly cannot be said to have 
prejudiced Plaintiff. It is clear that Plaintiff from 
the moment this case was at issue, knew the ques-
tion of lapse of time would be raised in this case. 
She knew full well that the Bank contended that 
an unreasonable and improper period of time had 
elapsed between the pledge of the stock certificates 
and the commencement of her action. 
This contention was never waived. The Bank 
merely sought to amend its pleadings to more pro-
perly classify its basic claim-(ie. to conform to a 
legal rather than equitable action.) 
A layman would have understandable difficulty 
in understanding the historical distinction between 
courts of law and equity. He would be even more 
confused to find that while these two systems now 
operate through the same courts and judiciary, the 
powers and issues of the two systems are still kept 
distinct in certain matters. But to explain to a lay-
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man how because the attorney raised the issue of 
an improper lapse of time, but chose to classify this 
issue by the language of the court of equity rather 
than law, and to find that this linguistic lapse pre-
cluded a determination of the issue on its merits, 
is impossible. It smacks of medieval sophistry and 
the esotericism of the common law forms of action, 
rather than the liberal common sense of our modern 
procedure. 
In what way did such an amendment prejudice 
Plaintiff? It would not vary in any way the evi-
dence offered. It did not even surprise Plaintiff, who 
already knew that the issue of lapse of time had 
been raised and would be urged. 
Thus, we submit that justice does indeed re-
quire a resolution at this point on its merits. 
POINT II. THE COURT ERRED IN DETERMIN-
ING THAT THE NEW EVIDENCE OF PLAINTIFF 
DID NOT SUBSTANTIALLY AFFECT THE QUESTION 
OF THE STATiUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
'This court in its opinion, appears to concede the 
possible applicability of the Statute of Limitations 
to this case. It asserts, however, that as "No new 
evidence was discovered during the trial which made 
this defense available where it had not been available 
under the facts known by the bank in the first in-
stance", the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
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in failing to allow an amendment so that this issue 
could be decided on its merits. 
It js earnestly contended that the statement 
does not reflect the record in this case and is incon-
sistent with the court's own decision. 
In Plaintiff's deposition taken prior to trial 
a.,nd th~ filing of an answer, as this court admitted, 
was one where ''Plaintiff indicated that she had 
endorsed the transfer clause on all three of the 
original certificates an·d left them with her broker." 
Assuming this to have been the case (and if the 
Plaintiff ·herself so stated, certainly the bank was 
justified in relying on the fact that the question of 
the genuiness of the endorsements was not an issue) 
there was no reason for Defendant to raise the ques-
tion of the Statute of Limitations. If there were no 
forgery, then as the dissenting opinion indicated, 
the bank could rely on the protection of the Uniform 
Stock Transfer Act, and in addition it did raise 
the issue of estoppel. 
However, at the trial, Plaintiff radically 
changed her testimony, asserting contrary to her 
previous testimony at the deposition, that all but 
one o fthe certificates had forged endorsements. 
The significance of this change in testimony 
was .readily apparent to all parties and to the trial 
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court as well. The trial was broken off in media res 
for a period of months while this evidence could be 
developed. 
The significance of the change in evidence was 
shown by the steps taken by Plaintiff to establish 
this newly asserted fact. Expert testimony was pro-
cured and extensive argument made. 
This court asserted "Nor did the surprise testi-
mony have any bearing on the question of whether 
Plaintiff's claim was based on the Statute of Limi-
tations." This court further stated that the amend-
ment proposed by the bank was made ''not because 
of new evidence which brought into operation that 
Statute but because the new evidence materially 
weakened another and entirely different defense 
of estoppel." 
It is submitted that to the contrary, there was 
a strong correlation between the new surprise evi-
dence and the defense of the Statute of Limitations. 
According to Mrs. Goeltz's earlier testimony, the 
bank was faced with a case where Mr. Goeltz 
pledged stock properly en·dorsed by his wife to which 
he had always had access. This raised questions of 
apparent authority and presented a case of a trans-
fer quite proper on its face. Effective arguments 
as to estoppel could be made on these facts. 
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Forgery removes the case from the subtleties 
of apparent authority. We are now faced with pa-
tent theft and conversion. A wrong upon which the 
Statute of Limitations commenced to run was com-
mitted immediately upon the removal and pledge 
of the certificates. Gone was the fuzziness of prov-
ing conversion where, with an un-forged document, 
the existence of apparent authority was strongly 
probable. In its place was a clearly defined wrong 
commi~tted at a clearly defined time. 
While appellants do not dispute the assertion 
of this court that the determination of forgery 
would have a bearing in weakening Appellant's 
arguments as to estoppel, it strongly urges that there 
is nothing incompatible between this and the fact 
that this new evidence strongly reinforces the bank's 
position as to unreasonable lapse of time. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that a rehearing 
should be granted and that the decree of the trial 
court be reversed and that defendant and appellant 
be allowed to amend its pleadings so that the ques-
tion of the Statute of Limitations might be decided 
on its merits. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PETER W. BILLINGS 
ALBERT J. COLTON 
Fabian, Clendenin, 
Moffat & Mabey 
8 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
